“We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army all forces on land, at sea, and in the air who are at this date under German control.”
– “Act of Military Surrender Signed at Berlin,” on 8 May 1945
Nazi Germany had just surrendered, but the war in the Pacific continued in full force …
In May 1945, Nazi Germany finally surrendered to the Allies. It was a day of great rejoicing, and the Allies had cause to rejoice at that time. But the Second World War was not yet over, because there was another conflict going on in the Pacific. That conflict was with Japan; and it continued to produce American casualties as a great battle raged at Okinawa. My grandfather was fighting there at Okinawa, and he was among a number who were psychologically scarred by the experience. Others were physically scarred, and others were sent home in coffins, never to be heard from again (or seen alive again). Okinawan civilians jumped off cliffs at this time, in the “certain” knowledge that they would be mistreated by the Americans. The few survivors were glad to find out that the Americans were much nicer than the Japanese propaganda films had portrayed them to be; but many a Japanese soldier preferred suicide to surrender, and actually committed suicide at this time. If we had been forced to invade the Japanese home islands, it seems that this scenario would have been repeated time and time again, with the same grim costs in human life. Such was the wisdom of instead bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
US Marines pass a dead Japanese soldier in a destroyed village - Okinawa, April 1945
The surrender needed to be unconditional (and yes, the surrender was unconditional)
But critics of dropping these bombs argue that “these weren't our only options,” and that the Japanese had been willing to surrender earlier. This argument is only partially correct, because they had been bargaining for conditions to the surrender. By “conditions,” I mean things that the American government would have been obliged to give them, as a “condition” of their surrender (conditions which were unacceptable). Critics of the “unconditional surrender” theory often argue that there was a condition of sorts, which was that they would be allowed to retain the institution of the Emperor. For example, they point to the first clause from Japan's postwar “Constitution of 1947,” which is as follows: “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” (Source: Chapter 1, Article 1) They also point to this other clause in the Constitution: “The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet. The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.” (Source: Chapter 1, Article 6) However, another clause in that same Constitution said that “The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government. The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law.” (Source: Chapter 1, Article 4) Thus, the retention of the Emperor was not as absolute as some today may have made it out to be, first of all. Secondly (and more to the point), none of these things were “conditions” for the surrender – the Japanese surrendered long before these things were ever assured. The “Instrument of Surrender” actually made no promises about the retention of the Emperor, in fact, and retained the option of doing away with the institution if they ever felt the situation warranted it later on. Thus, the fact that the Japanese got some of what they wanted here does not establish a “conditional” nature for the surrender. To establish this, you would have to show that their surrender was conditioned upon their getting these concessions up front. (And as the “Instrument of Surrender” clearly shows, this is not what happened.)
Aftermath of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, 1945
If there were “conditions,” they went the opposite direction from the one usually alleged …
As evidence of this, I examine the actual language of the surrender. For example, in the “Instrument of Surrender” itself, they agreed that “The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.” (Source: Last paragraph) This clause was “conditional,” it is true; but the conditions went in the opposite direction from the one that this argument requires. Rather than requiring the Americans to promise something, it required the Japanese to promise something. This clause conditioned any future authority to “rule the state” upon the approval of the Allied Supreme Commander; and thus refrained from promising that the Emperor would have any actual authority. That part was left to the discretion of the Supreme Commander himself, who was Douglas MacArthur at that time. Another clause in the “Instrument of Surrender” said that “all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people” had to “comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.” (Source: Third paragraph) Another clause required “all civil, military and naval officials” to “obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender” (Source: Fifth paragraph). The requirements for obedience were absolute here, and no exceptions were made for these requirements – not even for the retention of the Emperor. In another part of the “Instrument of Surrender,” the Japanese government actually proclaimed the “unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.” (Source: Second paragraph) Thus, it seems quite clear that the surrender was unconditional. A truly “conditional” surrender would have said something like “Our surrendering is conditional upon your honoring of these requests” (which it didn't say at any time). But if anything, the “conditional” behaviors went the other way around. The only “conditions” in the instrument were those that they had to honor, if they wanted to be spared further catastrophes like the atomic bombings that they had just received.
Surrender of Japan aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay – 2 September 1945
Response to the idea that the Japanese surrendered due to the attack by Soviet Russia ...
Some have argued that Japan surrendered for reasons other than the two bombs. For example, they note that the atomic bombs were dropped on August 6th for Hiroshima and August 9th for Nagasaki; but that the Soviets declared war on them on August 9th; invading their puppet state of Manchukuo. According to this group, the reason that the Japanese surrendered at this time was because they “didn't want a fourth major enemy” at this time in nearby Soviet Russia. However, Emperor Hirohito made a speech to the Japanese nation on the 15th of August, which was the first time most of the Japanese people had ever heard the Emperor's voice. He made no mention of the Soviet Union in this speech, except to say that he had “ordered [his] government to communicate to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union” that their empire was accepting the provisions of their joint declaration. No other reference was made to the Soviet Union in this speech. However, he did mention the bomb as a reason for their surrender. He first said that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.” (Source: The “Jewel Voice Broadcast”) He then said that “the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.” (Source: The “Jewel Voice Broadcast”) While his definition of “human civilization” was erroneously restricted to his own particular version of it, his reference to what he called the “new and most cruel bomb” would seem to be the best evidence of Japanese motivations t this time. He did not mention the feared Russians as a motivating factor, but only the bomb and the general “war situation” as such. “Such being the case,” he said, “how are we to save the millions of our subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.” (Source: The “Jewel Voice Broadcast”) This seems to me solid evidence of the importance of the bomb in bringing “unconditional surrender” from the Japanese at this time.
Emperor Hirohito
Conclusion: The case for dropping the bombs is a sound one
Thus, the case for dropping these two bombs is a sound one. A conditional surrender would have created some room for doubt about our right to run Japan for a time, until things improved. Limiting our war efforts to either firebombing or conventional bombing would not have been as effective, either physically or psychologically. (Indeed, these things had already been tried by that point; and had not yet produced results.) And any invasion of Japan would have produced far more casualties for both the Americans and the Japanese, and would have been far worse off for both of them. Thus, we have no need for a national “guilt complex” over the decision to drop these bombs (even if we do regret that it was necessary), and the decision was the right course to pursue at this time.
Footnote: The Tokyo war crimes trials
Many of my countrymen have heard of the Nuremberg war crimes trials, but fewer have heard of the Tokyo war crimes trials. After the surrender, there were war crimes trials in Tokyo just like there were at Nuremberg. The most prominent person to be tried there was the Japanese prime minister Hideki Tojo. Mr. Tojo was sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and hanged on December 23rd, 1948. This seems to provide further evidence that the Japanese surrender was unconditional. If the surrender had truly been conditional, it would seem that the government would have secured some immunity for itself as Prime Condition #1. But as the history of the Tokyo trials indicates, this is not what happened. Emperor Hirohito himself was the only one who was later granted any kind of immunity – and even then, never as a “condition” of the surrender. As the execution of Tojo shows, even the Japanese prime minister was not immune to prosecution; and others were punished besides Mr. Tojo as well.
If you liked this post, you might also like:
A review of "Japan: Memoirs of a Secret Empire" (PBS Empires)
A review of "A History of Japan" (Australian book)
A review of "Tora! Tora! Tora!" (1970)
A review of "The World at War" (World War Two documentary)
A review of Ken Burns' "The War" (World War Two documentary)
A review of "Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II" (BBC)
Japanese American soldiers in World War II
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