Sparks Commentary: Cold War crises: Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and “Able Archer 83”

“Is this a game, or is it real?”

– Quote from “WarGames” (1983), a fictional movie about a close call with nuclear war, which came out a few months before the first of these real-life crises

The Soviet Union shoots down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 …

In 1983, a Boeing 747 aircraft took off from JFK International Airport in New York City on the 30th of August. Its planned destination was Seoul in South Korea, but it was scheduled to make a stop in Anchorage, Alaska, and routinely did so on the following day (the 31st of August). But the aircraft actually never made it to its planned destination, because it was shot down the next day on the 1st of September. It was flying over prohibited Soviet airspace. The Soviets thus mistook it for an American spy plane, and sent up a Sukhoi SU-15 interceptor aircraft to shoot it down. The interceptor did the job with air-to-air missiles, and the aircraft quickly crashed into the Sea of Japan, near Moneron Island west of Sakhalin. All 269 passengers and crew were killed, including a United States Congressman from Georgia named Larry McDonald. Two weeks later, on the 15th of September, the Soviets actually found the wreckage under the sea; and in October, they even found the flight recorders. But they kept all of this secret for the next ten years, not releasing any of this until 1993. (I borrow some of the wording for this blog post from various parts of Wikipedia, which I must acknowledge here as a source.)

HL7442, the same plane that was shot down as “Korean Air Lines Flight 007”

The Soviets withhold critical evidence, and the world reacts to the incident …

This was the debacle of “Korean Air Lines Flight 007.” Naturally, people wondered what had happened to the flight when it did not arrive in Seoul as planned. The Soviet Union initially denied any knowledge of the incident, but later admitted shooting down the aircraft, claiming that it was indeed a spy plane. They even claimed that it was a deliberate provocation by the United States, by saying that the Americans were trying to probe the Soviets’ military preparedness, or even start a war. But in Ronald Reagan's words, the Soviets had “massacred” a planeful of civilians. Reagan correctly accused the Soviet Union of obstructing the international search and rescue operations. But that wasn’t all that the Soviets were obstructing – they were also hindering the investigation of the incident, by the International Civil Aviation Organization (or “ICAO”). This was because, among other things, they were suppressing the evidence of the flight recorders; and did not release them until after the Soviet Union was dissolved in the 1990’s. There was a marked increase in anti-Soviet sentiment at this time, particularly in the United States. The aircraft was indeed entering prohibited Soviet airspace, but they were doing so because of navigational errors, not because of attempts to violate Soviet airspace, or to engage in espionage. The true cause of the plane’s demise was thus Soviet paranoia, not American espionage.

A Soviet Sukhoi SU-15 Interceptor, of the kind that shot down Flight 007

The Soviets’ nuclear early-warning system malfunctions, showing phantom nuclear attacks …

But before the Soviets had found the flight recorders from Flight 007, there was another incident on the 26th of September that year, which also increased tensions between the superpowers. That day, the nuclear early-warning system of the Soviet Union reported the launch of one (and then five) USAF Minuteman Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles from bases in the United States. At first, the Russians thought that this might be an actual “first strike” by the United States. But fortunately, an officer in the Soviet Air Defense Forces found it suspicious that the Americans would send just five missiles, and thus identified the missile sightings (correctly) as a false alarm. Actually, their satellite warning system was malfunctioning badly, as later investigations by the Soviets themselves confirmed. The so-called “missiles” were really just a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds and the satellites’ orbits. I’m sure that they were thus relieved to discover that it was a false alarm, rather than an actual nuclear attack by the Americans. But the fact that their early-warning system had screwed up so badly had to be terrifying for them, because it could have triggered an actual Soviet response – and thus, an actual nuclear war with the dreaded American retaliation. It also terrified everyone else who found out about it, because a nuclear exchange would obviously have been bad for everyone. This was one of a number of incidents that made 1983 into something of a tense year for the Cold War. Much credit should also be given to Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, the Soviet officer who correctly diagnosed that the system was malfunctioning. He may have prevented World War Three, and thus saved a significant portion of the globe. (Of course, this was all top-secret at the time, and did not come to light until relatively recently.)

Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, the man who correctly diagnosed the malfunctioning system

NATO holds “Able Archer 83” military exercises, which are seen as the prelude to an attack …

But the most tense moment of that year was still to come. It began as a “military training” exercise conducted in Europe by the NATO nations. It is known by its codename of “Able Archer 83,” and it was a continuation of some of the “Able Archer” exercises that had been done in previous years. Like the previous Able Archer exercises, it was designed to simulate a coordinated nuclear attack for DEFCON 1, the lowest possible ranking for the national security of the United States. The “DEFCON 1” classification has never actually been used in the United States, because this is defined as an actual nuclear war. But as you may have guessed, the Russians mistakenly believed this to be the real thing. Part of it was that these exercises were designed to be more realistic than they had been in previous years. For example, there were a new and unique format of coded communication, radio silences, and the participation of actual heads of state (although this part never actually happened as planned). This also coincided with the anticipation of the arrival of American Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe, which alarmed the Russians. Indeed, this is what their deployment to nearby Europe had been meant to do – to alarm them. The Soviets had to feel like American retaliation for any attack on their part would be imminent, swift, and final.

The US Pershing II missile, of the kind that they anticipated would be deployed in Europe

This may be the most tense moment of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis …

People often point their fingers at the NATO heads of state, and particularly at Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. But again, the real cause of the incident was Soviet paranoia. They had misread the much-needed American preparations as a “yearning” for a nuclear war, and their misreading had almost caused them to press the buttons. This is believed to be the most tense moment of the Cold War, since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This was even more tense than the malfunctioning early-warning system that I mentioned earlier; because the false alarm (fortunately) had been viewed with a large degree of hopeful skepticism. Relations had already been deteriorating, due to the earlier shooting down of Flight 007. But things quickly became worse for these five days in November 1983, as the exercises of “Able Archer 83” were taken as a prelude to an attack. It was one of a number of dangerous miscalculations on the Russians’ part, and could have escalated things further. (Again, this was all top-secret at the time, and came to light only recently.)

A Soviet SS-20 missile

These events all happened within a few months of each other …

These incidents all occurred within a few months of each other, and made 1983 into a critical period for U.S.-Soviet relations. But the Americans and the Soviets were not the only people to be terrified at this prospect. Had there been an actual nuclear exchange, of course, much of the rest of the world would also have become engulfed in it. But along with these dangers, there was much to be glad about in these circumstances. The two sides had found each other very difficult to understand at times, but these misunderstandings had not been allowed to escalate into direct confrontation. Cooler heads eventually prevailed at this time, and in the latter two crises, the Russians eventually realized that their fears of an American “first strike” were unfounded. Each side knew that their ways of life were incompatible with one another, but they still knew that “peaceful coexistence” was possible. The conflict between them was fought by proxy wars (rather than a direct confrontation), and the hated nuclear exchange was thus averted, at least for a time.

USAF Minuteman III ICBM, of the general kind that the Soviets' early-warning system had falsely showed

Mankind has not crossed over into Jordan, but nor have we yet descended into Armageddon

There is talk of a Second Cold War today, with some of the same players as the first. But in spite of all these dangers, mankind was able to survive (and even thrive) in the First Cold War. Obviously, we have not crossed over into Jordan, but nor have we yet descended into Armageddon. These dangers can be averted, and the lessons of the past will show us how to survive them – and “come off conqueror.”

Footnote to this blog post:

The fictional movie “WarGames,” starring Matthew Broderick and Ally Sheedy, was released in May of 1983 – only a few months before the first of these things happened. Among other things, this movie depicts computer simulations of “nuclear war” scenarios, which some characters in the movie almost mistake for the real thing. If the real-life events of later that year reminded some of the movie “WarGames” in some ways, it is not hard to see why. The most frightening aspects of its plot are not that farfetched, and closely resemble certain aspects of some of these real-life crises.

See also:

“Korean Air Lines Flight 007” (Wikipedia article)

“1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident” (Wikipedia article)

“Able Archer 83” (Wikipedia article)

Related incidents:

“Norwegian rocket incident of 1995” (Wikipedia article)